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Abstract: Many governments subsidize regional rail service as an
alternative to road traffic. This paper assesses whether increases in
service frequency reduce road traffic externalities. We exploit differ-
ences in service frequency growth by procurement mode following a
railway reform in Germany to address endogeneity of service growth.
Increases in service frequency reduce the number of severe road traf-
fic accidents, carbon monoxide, nitrogen monoxide, nitrogen dioxide
pollution and infant mortality. Placebo regressions with sulfur diox-
ide and ozone yield no effect. Service frequency growth between 1994
and 2004 improves environmental quality by an amount that is worth
approximately 28-40 % of total subsidies. An analysis of household be-
havior shows that the effects of railway services on outcome variables
are driven by substitution from road to rail.
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Road transportation causes a large fraction of local and global pollution.
Moreover, it leads to accidents and congestion. Countries all over the world
have addressed these externalities with a wide range of policies, includ-
ing support for public transportation. Based on the argument that buses,
tramways and railroads have favorable environmental properties, many gov-
ernments subsidize public transportation. In the U.S., for example, President
Obama recently justified plans to construct fast rail corridors on environmen-
tal grounds.
Even so, very little is known about the actual environmental effects of
improvements in public transportation. For there to be a positive effect of
such improvements, two conditions must be jointly satisfied:
(C1) The improvement must induce a substantial substitution of traffic from
roads to public transportation.
(C2) Public transportation must involve lower externalities than road trans-
portation per passenger transported.
Neither of these conditions needs to be fulfilled. First, even if improved
public transportation increases ridership, this does not inevitably lead to
a large reduction in road transportation. For instance, the inhabitants of
large cities may move to the suburbs as public transportation becomes more
attractive. While they may use public transportation for some of their trips
(say, for commuting), they might still use the car more often than they would
have done in the city, because public transportation in the countryside is still
not a sufficiently good alternative for other activities.
Second, while public transportation is often said to perform better than
road transportation with respect to many environmental externalities, such
comparisons usually assume otherwise identical conditions (e.g., speed, ca-
pacity utilization, etc.). It is again not obvious that this assumption is ade-
quate to evaluate concrete policy measures. For instance, in rural regions, the
number of passengers per train may be so small that the emissions of most
major pollutants could well be higher than if these passengers had traveled
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by cars. Hence, a public transport policy that targets rural regions might
lead to increases in pollution.
This study measures the environmental effects of a specific public trans-
portation program in such a way that (C1) and (C2) can be jointly tested.
In Germany, regional passenger railway services expanded by 28 % between
1994 and 2004. During the same period, road accidents and most types of
local pollution declined. Yet clearly, this simple before-and-after comparison
says little about the causal effect of expanding regional passenger services.
The concentrations of many local pollutants have declined in the last decades
in many industrialized countries. To a large extent, this reflects changes in
the vehicle park which are unrelated to improvements in public transport.
Also, Germany witnessed changes in the economic and political landscape
and the implementation of important environmental policies in the nineteen
nineties.
To assess the environmental effects of expanding rail service, we collect
data on the evolution of the service frequency on all regional passenger rail-
way lines in Germany in 1994 and 2004.1 We then combine this information
on public transport capacity with county-level data on externalities: road
traffic accidents, carbon monoxide (CO), nitrogen monoxide (NO), nitrogen
dioxide (NO2), sulfur dioxide (SO2), and ground-level ozone (O3) pollution.
We also consider infant mortality rates.2
To isolate the effects of passenger railway support on environmental qual-
ity, we first use substantial differences across lines in the evolution of passen-
ger service frequency. We ask whether areas with greater improvements in
railway services also experienced a more favorable evolution of environmen-
tal quality. Our findings suggest there is no such effect. Clearly, this may
reflect endogeneity of increases in the regional passenger railway service ca-
pacity. Public transport may have been supported most in regions in which
authorities expected an increase in traffic volume and, thus, a deterioration of
1Lalive and Schmutzler (2011) also use these data to estimate the effects of procurement
mode on frequency of rail service.
2Luechinger (2009, 2011) uses data on SO2 pollution at the county level for Germany
in the period 1985-2003 to estimate the general effects on well-being and infant mortality,
respectively, without discussing the contribution of transportation.
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environmental quality. The positive effects of an increase in the frequency in
rail services on environmental quality would then be obscured by the adverse
underlying trend.
To address such problems, we exploit a railway reform in 1994. This
reform allowed regional passenger service agencies to choose between procur-
ing the service competitively via public tenders or negotiating with the in-
cumbent supplier. We argue that this reform serves as an instrument for
frequency of service. First, lines that were procured competitively between
1994 and 2004 exhibit much stronger growth of frequency of service than lines
that were not procured competitively (Lalive and Schmutzler 2008a, 2011).3
Second, competitive procurement represents an exogenous shock that serves
to increase the frequency of service without any direct effects on the environ-
ment. In particular, competition for the market seems to have little effects
on ticket prices or service quality which could have independent effects on the
demand for passenger railways. Third, decision makers who are in charge of
local railway procurement usually do not have a say in environmental policy
issues, which eliminates another source of correlation between procurement
mode and outcome variables. Fourth, there is no correlation between pro-
curement and voter preferences, which again makes it appear less likely that
there is a correlation between procurement and other green policies. Finally,
we find that environmental quality improved similarly in the four years prior
to the reform (1990 to 1994) along lines that were procured competitively
as along lines that were procured in direct negotiations with the incumbent
supplier. Taken together, these reasons imply that procurement mode is a
valid instrument for growth of frequency of train service.
Our analysis supports the hypothesis that improvements in the quality of
local passenger transportation cause improvements in the outcome variables
of interest. First, we find a substantial negative effect of improved passen-
ger transportation on road accidents. Because road accidents are exclusively
the result of road transportation, this finding suggests that increasing the
3Lalive and Schmutzler (2008a) focuses on the state of Baden-Wu¨rttemberg, Lalive and
Schmutzler (2011) refines the analysis and extends it to the entire country. The authors
argue that the correlation between the mode of procurement and the frequency of service
can be given a causal interpretation.
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frequency of regional passenger railway services reduces road traffic (C1).
Second, we observe negative and significant effects of an increase in the fre-
quency of service on NO and NO2; the effects on CO are also negative, but
weaker and imprecisely estimated. Third, we test the validity of the instru-
ment by placebo regressions on SO2 pollution; SO2 is mainly emitted from
power stations. We find that improving the railway service frequency has
no effects on the concentration of SO2. Similarly, we do not find any effect
of railway services on O3. Again, this is not surprising. Even though road
traffic is an important source of O3 and CO, NO and NO2 are precursors of
O3, the complex chemistry of ozone formation often leads to high O3 con-
centrations far away from the emission sources. Fifth, we find some evidence
that the increase in the frequency of rail services reduced infant mortality
rates. Summing up, our analysis supports the idea that improvements in the
quality of railway services can substantially reduce road traffic externalities.
As a robustness exercise, we show that our results survive the introduction
of additional instruments that are based on frequencies of long-distance trains
in 1939 and 1994. Finally, we analyze the mechanisms behind the improve-
ments in environmental quality. Data on travel mode indicates that car and
motorcycle use for commuting to work and leisure activities has grown less
strongly along lines that were served more frequently with regional passen-
ger trains. These results indicate that expansions of local passenger railways
enhances the environment due to substitution from cars and motorcycles to
trains and increases in income. This yields even more direct support of hy-
pothesis (C1) than the observation that improved passenger transportation
reduces road accidents.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related literature.
Section 3 provides a brief account of the relevant institutions. Section 4 in-
troduces the data. In Section 5, we introduce the framework for the empirical
analysis. Section 6 contains the results. Section 7 provides rough estimates
of the monetary value of the improvements. Section 8 concludes.
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2 Related Literature
A large literature deals with the effects of transportation policies on the
environment.4 To relate our contribution to this literature, note that our
paper tests (C1) and (C2) hold jointly. Moreover, our results with survey
data suggest that (C1) holds individually. Existing papers deal with (C1)
and (C2) as follows.
(C1) Many papers attempt to quantify the effect of public transport im-
provements on ridership and the induced reductions in car transportation.
Typically, these studies either suffer from endogeneity problems, or they es-
timate short-term elasticities, ignoring the long-term adjustments. Evans
(2004) reviews evidence on the elasticities of public transport ridership with
respect to service frequency. For railways, the elasticities are between 0.5
and 0.9.5 Evans (2004) contains evidence for mode shifts from roads to public
transport from experiments in the Boston area carried out in the nineteen
sixties. He reports that 64 % of the riders attracted by increasing commuter
rail frequency previously used their own car; 17 % a carpool and 19 % the bus.
In a recent study, Duranton and Turner (2011) find no effects of expanding
peak bus service on vehicle kilometers traveled on interstate highways across
metropolitan statistical areas in the U.S. However, they look at traffic within
metropolitan areas in the U.S. – a context in which bus service is marginal.
(C2) Engineering studies provide “emissions coefficients” which give in-
formation on the emissions characteristics of cars and railways. Together
with information on capacity utilization of cars and railways, such informa-
tion allows to compare the emissions per passenger kilometer. For instance,
IFEU (2010) provides such a comparison for Germany, while INFRAS (2010)
provides a detailed analysis for automobiles. The analysis broadly supports
the view that, for most pollutants, the specific emissions for railways are
lower than those for cars. It also shows, however, that there are substantial
differences across pollutants and the relative advantage of railways has been
declining over time. The problem with these measures is that they depend
4See Schmutzler (2011) for a recent survey.
5For buses, the average service elasticity, the percentage change in ridership induced by
a 1 % change in the frequency of service, is approximately 0.5. The elasticities are higher
when initial service levels are low.
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highly on the specific context, such as the type of road, topography, traffic
situation and driving behavior. Also, they are typically average measures and
not the marginal measures that are relevant when policy effects are studied.
Existing studies therefore support the notion that each of the statements
(C1)-(C2) holds individually. A recent contribution by Chen and Whalley
(2012) tests (C1) and (C2) jointly. The paper shows how the introduction of a
Mass Transportation System in Taipei in 1996 led to a significant drop in CO
emissions (by 9-14 %), with similar yet insignificant effects for NOx. There
were no clear-cut effects on O3 formation, which reflects the complexities of
the chemistry of ozone.6
Another important strand of literature investigates the claim that pollu-
tion reductions actually have positive health effects. For instance, Chay and
Greenstone (2003a,b) used changes in TSP pollution induced by recession
and regulation in the U.S. to document that TSP pollution increases infant
mortality substantially. Similarly, Luechinger (2011) uses the natural exper-
iment created by the mandated de-sulfurization at power plants in Germany
to show that SO2 pollution increases infant mortality. Currie and Neidell
(2005) exploit within zip-code month by month variation in pollution levels
and link it to individual data on infant survival in California. They find a
negative effect of CO on infant survival, but no effects of PM and O3. Currie
and Walker (2011) show how the introduction of electronic toll collection
reduced traffic congestion and emissions and thereby improved the health of
infants in the immediate vicinity. The evidence regarding adult mortality
is less conclusive: While early cross-section estimates find a positive asso-
ciation between air pollution and adult mortality (Mendelsohn and Orcutt
1979), more recent and sophisticated studies fail to do so (Chay et al. 2003).
Our paper contributes to the existing literature in four ways. First, it con-
siders a comprehensive set of (local) externality measures: road accidents,
air pollution, and infant health. Second, the paper uses a different econo-
metric approach than the previous studies, exploiting geographical variation
of growth in railway services and instrumenting with the type of procure-
6See the discussion in the introduction. Also note that Davis (2008) studies the effects
of direct driving restrictions on air pollution in Mexico City – a related but different
context. He finds that weekday limitations to driving a car had no effects on air quality.
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ment to identify the policy effects. Third, this paper analyzes the effects of
a nation-wide policy in a Western industrialized country with very low levels
of air pollution. This setting makes it harder to find effects and is relevant
for countries with similar levels of pollution. Finally, it directly identifies
substitution from road to rail as the mechanism leading to reductions of
externalities.
3 Institutional Background
Until 1994, railways in Germany were run by two vertically integrated state
monopolists (Deutsche Bundesbahn and Deutsche Reichsbahn), one in West
Germany and one in East Germany. In 1994, a major railway reform be-
came effective, which not only created Deutsche Bahn AG as a successor of
Deutsche Bundesbahn and Deutsche Reichsbahn, but also led to measures
that affected regional passenger transportation in several important ways.
First, the overall budget for regional passenger transportation increased.
Starting in 1996, the central government has distributed approximately 6-7
billion EUR per year to the 16 German states. They can use the money to
procure passenger services on the non-profitable part of the network.7 Sec-
ond, the states assign responsibility for planning and procurement to agencies
which act on the basis of state law.8 Third, the service level on a particular
part of the network and the amount of state transfers that a railway company
receives for its services is now pre-specified in a long-term contract. Fourth,
this contract is not necessarily the result of negotiations between the agency
and the supplier, but it can, in principle, also be procured in a competitive
auction. In the simplest case, the agency pre-specifies the desired quantity
of railway services and quality aspects such as properties of the vehicles; the
bid submitted by the firm is the level of transfer payments they demand to
procure the desired service.9
7The value for 2004 was approximately 6.8 billion EUR (SCI 2006). The funds cannot
be used to procure long-distance passenger services (Intercity and Intercity-Express); it is
expected that the dominant firm DB Fernverkehr supplies these services profitably.
8Almost all states have laws (Nahverkehrsgesetze) governing local public passenger
transportation.
9In other cases, the firms can submit bids that contain not only transfer payments, but
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Competitive procurement auctions have been used quite often between
1994 and 2004. Figure 1 displays a map of all regional passenger railway lines
shaded according to procurement status. Bold lines were procured compet-
itively (138 out of 551), whereas thin lines (413 out of 551) were procured
in direct negotiations with the incumbent. The map reveals that compet-
itive mechanisms were used to procure parts of regional passenger service
networks. Both lines that serve a regional center as well as lines that do not
were procured competitively. Moreover, the map also shows that competi-
tive and non-competitive lines co-exist within the same state. The empirical
analysis will focus on using such within state variation.
— Figure 1 about here —
Competitive procurement has had a substantial impact on service fre-
quency. The overall level of services has increased substantially.10 Between
1994 and 2004, the average frequency of service on the lines with competitive
procurement grew from 10,888 trains in 1994 to 16,466 in 2004, that is, by
51 %. The corresponding figures for lines without competitive procurement
were 15,090 in 1994 and 18,738 in 2004 (24 %). Thus, not only was there a
substantial overall growth, but this was more pronounced on the lines that
were exposed to competition than on the remaining part of the network.
— Figure 2 about here —
This correlation between competitive procurement and growth in the fre-
quency of services will play an important role in our identification strategy.
Figure 2 plots a kernel density estimate of the growth in service quality from
1994 to 2004, again differentiating between competitively procured lines and
others. Most lines enjoyed positive growth, some even a duplication of the
frequency of service.
We shall argue below how we will use the positive correlation between
competitive procurement and growth of service frequency for identification.
However, one might argue that the mode of procurement could affect the
also some aspects of quality, which are then weighted in a suitable scoring rule.
10See also Lalive and Schmutzler (2008a, 2011)
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extent of substitution from road to rail (and thereby our dependent variables)
through other channels. This might happen either because the incumbent
applies different tariffs in cases where it has to win the market in competitive
tendering or because the competitors who win a market set lower ticket prices.
Neither of these concerns appears to be justified. First, where the incumbent
is free to set its price, the ticket price is based on distance, not on the
specific line. Second, in many regions, local public transport organizations
rather than railway companies set ticket prices which are identical regardless
of the mode of procurement. Third, outside those regions, tenders usually
require the application of the tariff of the incumbent by its competitors.
Similarly, the mode of procurement could affect other dimensions of quality
rather than just the frequency of service. While we are not aware of any
systematic evidence on this, a recent ranking in Bavaria suggest that there
is no systematic advantage of the competitors over the incumbent in this
regard (BEG 2011).
Finally, it is important to collect some facts about the decision-making
authority regarding policies that can potentially influence the outcome vari-
ables. First, decisions on the quantity and quality of roads are taken at
all levels of the jurisdictional hierarchy, depending on the type of road un-
der considerations. The Federal Ministry of Transportation (BMVBS) is
responsible for motorways (Bundesautobahnen) and other major roads (Bun-
desstrassen).11 The state governments set priorities for roads of intermediate
importance.12 They also define the duties of the local governments which
typically decide on the policy towards smaller roads, parking policies, etc.13
Second, the taxes that are most likely to affect road transportation (vehicle
11For instance, the Ministry provides five-year plans for major investments (a recent
example is the Investitionsrahmenplan bis 2010 fu¨r die Verkehrsinfrastruktur des Bundes)
and decides on major projects.
12To this end, they use long-term plans (Landesstrassenbedarfspla¨ne).
13Local governments typically formulate a long-term plan (Verkehrsentwicklungsplan)
that identifies priorities for road infrastructure. They also lay down fee structures for
parking, which are potentially of great importance for the development of passenger trans-
portation. For instance paragraph 1(2) in the Verordnung u¨ber Zusta¨ndigkeiten im Bereich
Verkehr of the State of Lower Saxony stipulates that local jurisdictions have the right to
define parking fees.
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taxes and gasoline taxes) are set at the federal level. Third, safety regulations
are also typically set at the federal level.14 Finally, while decisions regard-
ing air quality are made both at the federal and at the state level, federal
decisions dominate in conflicting cases.
Thus, while the decisions on railway procurement (in particular, on the
mode) are made at the state level, the role of the states for other policies
affecting transportation and the environment is much more limited. Also,
even if the states are responsible, the agency in charge is not identical with the
one that deals with procurement, and effects of decisions are state-wide rather
than local. All told, it seems unlikely that there is a substantial correlation
between local railway procurement decisions and other determinants of local
environmental quality arising because the same decision makers are in charge.
4 Data
We combine railway data with county-level data on road traffic accidents, air
pollution, infant mortality and travel modes.
Main explanatory variable: The explanatory variable of primary in-
terest is (the log of one plus) the frequency of service, defined as the number
of passenger trains per year on a line. In tedious work, we collected this
information on the basis of published railway timetables for the years 1994
and 2004, i.e. the last year before and the year one decade after the start of
the reform process (Lalive and Schmutzler 2011).15
Instruments: Following Lalive and Schmutzler (2011), we define a line
as competitive if at least 20 % of the services were procured competitively.
The overwhelming majority of these cases correspond to competitive tenders
which were wither won by DB Regio itself or some competitor, but we also
included cases where an ownership change took place for other reasons.16
14The relevant legal document is the Strassenverkehrsordnung of 1970
(http://bundesrecht.juris.de/stvo/).
15We decompose the rail network following the classification of lines in the official timeta-
bles, with two exceptions. First, to avoid double-counting of trains, we deleted parts of
lines that are also contained in other lines. Second, to have a clear assignment of a line to
a state, we divided lines that do not lie completely within one state into several lines.
16We are grateful to Felix Berschin for providing us with a list of competitve tenders;
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Railway timetables were included as sources for the instruments that rely
on long-distance transportation. Specifically, we used the timetables for 1939
(Deutsche Reichsbahn) and 1994 (Deutsche Bahn) to obtain the number of
long-distance passenger trains that run on at least 25 % of the line under
consideration on Monday to Friday.17
Outcome variables: The data on accidents refer to severe road ac-
cidents involving injuries or fatalities. This information is collected by the
Kraftfahrzeugbundesamt, the federal agency for road transportation, for all of
Germany at the level of individual counties. We used these data for 1995 and
2005, because data for 1994 and 2004 were not available. We have informa-
tion on the concentration levels of six air pollutants, namely CO, NO, NO2,
SO2 and O3. The data are from the Umweltbundesamt (UBA), the federal
environmental agency. The UBA provides data on annual mean concentra-
tions for each pollutant measured at monitors belonging to the monitoring
networks of the 16 state environmental agencies and the UBA. CO monitor-
ing started only in 1997.18 In order to estimate the pollution concentrations
at all other locations, we interpolate the monitor readings on a grid cover-
ing the whole area of Germany using inverse distance weighting.19 We then
aggregate interpolated values to the county level.
Our data on air pollution refer to an important subset of pollutants as-
sociated to road traffic. We therefore also analyze whether infant mortality
is affected by changes in the frequency of rail service. Infant mortality is an
indicator that will reflect all local pollution that matters for infant health.
in addition, we could obtain information on ownership chages from the Deutsche Bahn
timetables.
17In 1939, we included trains of the categories D, FD and L; in 1994, we included ICE
trains.
18Data are available for 310 (1997) and 207 (2004) monitors for CO, 323 (1994) and 410
(2004) monitors for NO, 404 (1994) and 410 (2004) monitors for NO2, 513 (1994) and 265
(2004) monitors for SO2, and 319 (1994) and 205 (2004) monitors for O3.
19The method of inverse distance weighting requires the choice of two parameters: the
number of monitors used in the interpolation and the power parameter. We have chosen
these parameters so as to get a large correlation between actual readings at each monitor
and the pollution level that would be predicted by the interpolation if the monitor in ques-
tion was not there (Currie and Neidell 2005 suggest this approach to assess the accuracy
of the interpolation procedure).
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Infant mortality is reported as the number of deaths within one year after
birth per 1000 live births. The data on infant mortality originally came from
the 15 state statistical agencies.20 The state agencies are required by federal
laws to collect data on births and deaths in a standardized way. Aggre-
gated values at the county level are then either published in state reports or
available on request.21 We use the three year average 1993-1995 to estimate
infant mortality in 1994 and the three year average 2003-2005 to assess infant
mortality in 2004.22
The German Socio Economic Panel (SOEP) contains individual infor-
mation on the type of travel mode normally used for commuting, leisure
activities (cinema, soccer game, etc.), shopping, week-end trips and bring-
ing children to school (see Wagner et al. 2007). Individuals choose between
the following travel modes: public transport, car, motorcycle, bicycle, or by
foot. We aggregate individual responses to the county level and calculate the
probability of travelling by car or motorcycle conditional on using at least
one of the travel modes. The closest information available on travel mode
around the reform date is 1998. Travel mode information is also available in
2003.
All measures of road traffic externalities, travel mode, and economic per-
formance are available at the county level (for a total of 439 counties in
Germany; Landkreise). As our data points correspond to lines which might
run through several counties, we take the average value of the outcome vari-
able in all counties to construct a measure of the outcome variable for the
line under consideration.
Controls: The data also include controls for important line-level char-
acteristics (distance to nearest large city, length of line and information on
electrification).
20Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein share one agency.
21The German Youth Institute, an independent research institute on children and fam-
ilies, compiled and courteously provided the data.
22For confidentiality reasons, states do not report infant mortality rates based on a small
number of cases. In small counties with few births and infant deaths, infant mortality rates
are missing in some years.
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5 Empirical Framework
We now introduce a simple model from which we derive hypotheses on the
determinants of environmental quality and related outcome variables. We
adopt a unified approach that emphasizes the similarities between the differ-
ent pollutants by relating pollution to a small number of identical explanatory
variables. Thus, we do not address the differences in the spatial and tem-
poral diffusion patterns across pollutants. Yet this unified approach enables
us to provide the key estimate on the causal effects of expanding regional
passenger rail service on emissions.
Let Yit capture environmental damage along a line i during a time period
t. Our specification takes into account that the damage is affected by total
passenger transportation, the modal split and potentially by other variables.
Let Tit denote total transport demand.
23 We focus on the two main modes
of regional traffic: cars and trains. We assume that an increased frequency
of service of trains, FOSit, reduces car traffic. Specifically, we suppose the




where γ is a parameter to be estimated. Note that CARit = 1 if there are
no train services, and CARit decreases in FOSit if γ > 0.
The empirical analysis focuses on various outcome measures, including
the concentrations of several pollutants, accidents and infant mortality. We
index these measures by s. θCs measures the contribution of one unit of car
traffic to measure s, and θTs is the corresponding parameter for train traffic.
For instance, when referring to pollution, θCs measures the pollution intensity
of cars concerning pollutant s. Similarly, θCs captures the risk of getting into
a road accident when s corresponds to the number of accidents. This means
23We do not explicitly model the sources of the level of transport demand. These
could be plausibly related to gross domestic product per capita and population. However,
population and gross domestic product enter the analysis only via their (positive) effect
on transportation, which also implies a positive effect on emissions. As will be discussed
in more detail in Section 6, both variables may have independent effects on emissions,
and there are also reasons why pollution might affect these variables, suggesting reverse
causality.
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that outcome variable s is
Y sit = (θ
C
s CARit + θ
T
s (1− CARit))Titexp(αi + τjt + εit) (1)
where αi is location specific unobserved effect, εit reflects other sources of
emissions, τjt are time effects which we allow to differ across states j to
capture changes in background pollution.
The (natural) logarithmic version of this equation is
logY sit = log
(




+ logTit + αi + τjt + εit (2)
For accidents, the outcome variable is interpreted as the total (log) number.
Our other outcomes are pollution concentrations and infant mortality rate.
Since in a constant volume of air an increase in emissions leads to a propor-
tionate increase in pollution concentration and since infant mortality rates
depend on prevailing concentration levels, (2) can still be applied.24
In the empirical analysis, we will rely on the following log-linear approx-
imation to equation (2)25
logY sit = δlogCARit + logTit + αi + τjt + εit
= −δγlog(1 + FOSit) + logTit + αi + τjt + εit (3)
This log-linear specification (3) is only an approximation to the true spec-
ification (2). Yet this approximation provides important information on the
24To see this divide both sides of (1) by a measure of the volume of air that is affected
by emissions of type s. Denote this volume by Ai. Hence, logAi should be subtracted
from equation (2). However as logAi does not change in time, it will cancel out after
first differencing. Infant mortality is measured as the number of infant deaths within one
year after birth per 1,000 live births. This mortality measure is likely to be affected by
concentration of pollutants along each line i. We therefore also use specification (2) to
analyze infant mortality.
25Note that this log-linear equation (3) can be studied using standard linear least squares
or instrumental variables methods. Estimation of the non-linear equation (2) is challenging
since the non-linear part of (2) contains three parameters, but only one regressor, that
is, the equation is not identified. Moreover, the log-linear approximation (3) provides an
estimate of how expanding regional passenger services translates into improvements of
environmental quality. This is the relevant policy parameter.
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relative contribution of cars and trains to environmental quality s. In par-














which is 0 if trains and cars contribute equally, and it is 1 if trains do
not contribute at all. The approximation (2) is exact, if the train-specific
contribution to the outcome variable is zero (θTs = 0), which is the case for
accidents. In this case, the elasticity of accidents with respect to the share
riding by car, δ, is 1 (increasing the share riding by car by 1 % also increases
accidents by 1 %). This means that the coefficient associated with log fre-
quency of service directly measures the substitution parameter γ. Analyzing
road accidents is therefore crucial for two reasons. First, the analysis in-
forms on externalities due to accidents. Second, accidents directly inform
on whether substitution takes place. Moreover, it follows that the coeffi-
cient relating log outcome s with log frequency of service should be smaller
than for accidents in all outcomes where trains contribute to generating the
externality.
To remove the fixed region effect, we look at changes between t−1 = 1994
and t = 2004. Using ∆τj ≡ τjt − τjt−1 and ∆ε ≡ εit − εi,t−1, the difference
specification corresponding to (3) is
∆logYi = −δγ∆log(1 + FOSi) + ∆logTi +∆τj +∆ε (4)
We estimate specification (4) directly in the empirical analysis. We also
present estimates that add time invariant line characteristics to (4) to re-
flect changes in the evolution of unmeasured transport demand (∆logTit)
along lines with different characteristics. Note that frequency of service is
endogenous as it is likely to be correlated with the change in transport de-
mand ∆logTit, which we cannot observe. We therefore instrument it using
the 1994 reform that allows German regional passenger service agencies to
choose between auctioning a line and negotiating the service directly with
the incumbent.26
26An additional problem with least squares estimation of this equation is due to log-
linearizing. Santos Silva and Tenreyo (2006) show that the estimated parameters in log-
16
The choice of the instrument is motivated by the strong positive correla-
tion between the competitive procurement and service growth between 1994
and 2004 (Figure 2). This means that competitive procurement predicts ser-
vice frequency growth. Arguably, procurement auctions affect train service
frequency monotonically and positively. Lalive and Schmutzler (2011) show
that the positive effect of competition on the frequency of services is the mir-
ror image of a negative effect of competition on the procurement prices paid
by the agencies: Where competitive procurement takes place, agencies ex-
pect to pay less than when there are direct negotiations with the incumbent.
Accordingly, they are prepared to procure greater quantities.27
However, for competition to be a valid instrument, it must also be un-
related to the evolution of environmental quality. This requirement cannot
be tested. What can be tested is whether procurement of a train line is re-
lated to trends in environmental quality before the reform. We discuss this
below and find no differences in the evolution of environmental quality be-
fore the railway reform in 1994. Moreover, we also test whether competitive
procurement is related to environmental quality in 1994. Our analysis in the
appendix uncovers two main findings (Table A.1). First, regressions that do
not control for line characteristics suggest that lines with low frequency of
service, few accidents, high CO and NO2 pollution but high infant mortality
in 1994 were more likely to be chosen for competitive procurement between
1994 and 2004. Second, once we condition on key line characteristics (trac-
tion, electrification, etc.) and state effects, these partial correlations drop
to a level that is not distinguishable from zero (except for infant mortail-
ity). This suggests that choice of procurement mode is not related to the
initial level of environmental quality conditional on line characteristics. In
linearized versions of estimating equations are biased if the error term in the original
equation (1) is heteroskedastic. This is because expectations of the log of the error term
involves higher order moments of the error term itself. Note that this problem is unlikely
to be relevant in the current application. We focus on instrumental variable estimates of
(2) which are consistent as long as the instrument is mean independent of the error in the
log-linearized version of the model.
27There are two reasons why agencies nevertheless do not procure all lines competitively:
first, the large administrative costs of auctions and second, the influence activities of the
incumbent.
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this sense, the mode of procurement is as good as randomly assigned.
Moreover, though one might expect that competition affects the substi-
tution from road to rail by other channels than the increase in the frequency
of service, there is little evidence that this concern is justified. As discussed
in Section 3, competition for the market affects does not seem to affect rider-
ship via reduced ticket prices or improved quality. Moreover, Section 3 shows
that the institutional structure also makes it unlikely that the decisions on
procurement mode are directly related to environmental policy decisions.
Finally, the procurement mode of a line is unrelated to voter preferences in
the Kreis, as measured by the proportion of voters in favor of the left-wing
parties in the state government elections in 1997 (see Table A.1 below).
As a robustness exercise, we use two other instruments, relating to the
frequency of long-distance train service. The railway reform was introduced
soon after the German reunification. It is thus plausible that growth of
regional passenger services in the period we consider reflects adjustments to
pre World-War II transportation patterns to some extent. We thus introduce
a measure of the frequency of express trains (D-Zu¨ge and FD-Zu¨ge) in 1939
to capture the potential for traffic growth after re-unification. In addition, it
is highly plausible that, the growth potential of regional passenger traffic may
be curtailed if a line is heavily utilized for competing usages. We thus took
the frequency of long-distance trains (ICE) in 1994 as another instrument.
6 Results
6.1 Descriptive Statistics
Sections A and B of Table 1 provide descriptive statistics on our dependent
variables. The first line indicates that the number of severe road accidents
has decreased substantially over the period 1994 to 2004; the median reduc-
tion in accidents is 10.2 % (100 (exp (−0.108)− 1) = −10.237). Air quality
has improved substantially for all measures except O3. For instance, the me-
dian reduction of CO was 35.6 %. For SO2, which is essentially unrelated to
road transportation, the reduction was 66.1 %. In particular this last figure
strongly suggests that the improvements cannot completely be attributed to
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public transportation, thus illustrating the need for a more careful economet-
ric analysis. Finally, infant mortality also decreased by 25 %, a substantial
improvement.
— Table 1 about here —
For all variables, the standard deviation is substantial, indicating large
regional variation in the outcome variables.
Table 1C summarizes the independent variables. The first line contains
our key variable of interest, namely the evolution of regional passenger rail-
way services. It identifies a substantial overall increase, with a median growth
of 26.6 %. The large standard deviation suggests the possibility that differ-
ences in the evolution of service quality may have contributed to the different
developments in the outcome variables. Below, we will investigate whether
this is indeed true.
Moreover, Table 1C also shows that train lines differ with respect to
traction, length and distance to large cities. About 45 % of all railway
lines are electrified. The mean length of a line is 3.8 log kilometers, which
translates to 45 kilometers. Distance to city measures the remoteness of a
line. Distance to city is zero if the line runs through a city of at least 100,000
inhabitants in 1994. For railway lines that do not run through a city the
distance is the length of the shortest passenger railway connection between a
city and one of the stations on the line. The average distance is 17 kilometers,
the median is 0.
Table 1D shows that 25 % of the railway lines were classified as compet-
itive. In 1939, on about 20 % of the lines, at least six long-distance trains
per day used at least part of the line. In 1994, on about 5 % of the lines, at
least six express trains per day used at least part of the line.
6.2 Econometric results
We first discuss naive regressions that do not account for endogeneity of ser-
vice frequency growth. We then focus on the results that rely on procurement
status as an instrument. After that, we discuss robustness to our alternative
IVs. Finally, using survey data, we investigate the mechanisms by which
public transport affects outcome variables.
19
6.2.1 Basic results
Table 2 provides OLS regressions of the differences in the log of the outcome
variables on the differences in the log of the frequency of railway services, with
different controls. The table shows no effect of service quality on outcome
variables.
— Table 2 about here —
The absence of clear effects may signal endogeneity problems. If passenger
railways systematically obtain more support where the outcome variables are
expected to deteriorate because of increasing transport volumes, a beneficial
effect may be obscured in an OLS regression. Indeed, Section 16 in LNVG
(2010) clearly indicates that favorable demand projections are decisive for
supply increases. We address this issue with an IV approach that uses the
procurement mode of the railway line as an instrument.
Table 3 presents first stage results. Column 1, which uses information
on electrification, length, and distance to city, shows that the frequency of
service grew more strongly on lines that were competitively procured than
on lines that were not. This result is both quantitatively important and sta-
tistically significant. The F-statistic on the instrumental variable is 10.256,
suggesting that procurement mode is not a weak instrument. Service fre-
quency increases 14.4 % more strongly on comparatively procured lines than
under direct negotiations.
— Table 3 about here —-
Column 2 in Table 3 uses the procurement status of the line along with
two measures of the frequency of long-distance train service used in the ro-
bustness analysis. Historical frequency of service in 1939 measures whether
a line was served by more than six long-distance trains per day in 1939. In-
terestingly, lines that were frequently served by long-distance trains in 1939
also grow 9 % more strongly between 1994 and 2004 than train lines that
were not as frequently served by long-distance trains in 1939. In contrast,
lines that are frequently served by long-distance trains in 1994 grow 12 %
less strongly over the 1994 to 2004 period, consistent with the intuition that
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long-distance trains act as a capacity constraint. Historical service of train
lines therefore predicts service growth over the 1994 to 2004 period. Note,
however, that the F-statistic testing the joint significance of the three instru-
ments is 6.940, signalling the presence of weak instruments. We therefore
use limited information likelihood (LIML) in estimates that rely on all three
instruments.
Table 4 presents the reduced form estimates of procurement mode on
the change in environmental quality between 1994 and 2004. Results indi-
cate significantly negative effects on all measures of environmental quality.
Accidents decrease by 6.3 percentage points more strongly on competitively
procured lines than on lines that were procured in direct negotiations. A
similar decrease effect is found for infant mortality and NO concentration.
Concentration of CO and NO2 also decreases, but to a lower extent.
— Table 4 about here —-
Table 5 discusses whether the outcome variables evolved more favorably
before the railway reform, in the 1990 to 1994 period. The analysis focuses
on the evolution of NO, NO2 and infant mortality because data on the other
measures of environmental quality were not available.28 Results indicate
that the 1990 to 1994 change in NO and NO2 concentration was the same
along lines that were procured competitively in the 1994 to 2004 period
as along lines procured in direct negotiations. Results for infant mortality
are similar. These results suggest that there was no differential change in
environmental quality by procurement status of the line – consistent with the
main identifying assumption that environmental quality would have improved
in the same fashion on competitively procured lines as on the remaining lines.
— Table 5 about here —-
Table 6 presents the IV results with the procurement instrument. For
most outcome variables where better railway services should be expected to
contribute to an improvement, this is indeed the case. The effect is strongest
28CO data is not available before 1997 and there are no local data on road accidents
before 1995.
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for accidents where we find an elasticity of -0.46, suggesting that road ac-
cidents are reduced by 4.6 % if the frequency of service increases by 10 %.
This estimate reflects the fact that road accidents are entirely the result of
road transportation (Section 5). Table 6 also shows substantial and signif-
icant effects for NO and NO2. Point estimates for NO indicate that a 10
% increase in the frequency of service reduces NO concentration along the
line by 3.8 % and NO2 by 1.7 %. As for accidents, this finding is likely to
reflect reductions in road traffic, which is a substantial source of NOx emis-
sions. Although road traffic is also an important source of CO pollution, our
results for CO are weaker and less precisely estimated (Table 6, column 2).
A potential explanation is data quality.29
— Table 6 about here —-
Results suggest that expanding rail service reduces air pollution. Does
this improvement in air quality matter for infant mortality (Table 6, column
5)? We find a significantly negative elasticity. A 10 % increase in the fre-
quency of service reduces infant mortality by 4.6 % (significant at the 10
% level), which could at least partly reflect reduced NOx pollution. While
our estimates of the service elasticity are not directly comparable to existing
pollution elasticities of infant mortality, the magnitude of the frequency of
service elasticity is certainly in the range of the elasticities that have been
documented.30 Nevertheless, the results for infant mortality need to be qual-
ified. Improvements in infant mortality could, for instance, also be due to
improvements in health care due to GDP growth.31
29CO pollution is only available from 310 monitors in 1997 and 207 monitors in 2004,
whereas NOx is measured by 400 monitors or more (except for NO in 1994) providing a
more disaggregate picture of local air pollution.
30The literature has documented a broad range of elasticities of infant mortality with
respect to road traffic externalities. For instance, Currie et al. (2009) document an
elasticity of 0.03 for CO whereas Currie and Schmieder (2009) document an elasticity of
VOCs of 6.1.
31We have explored regressions that condition on population and GDP growth (re-
sults not shown). Note that population and GDP growth are potentially endogenous to
expanded regional passenger service. Nonetheless, estimates of frequency of service on ac-
cidents, CO, NO and NO2 remain robust. Estimates of the effects of frequency of service
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Table 7 contains the results of placebo regressions that study measures of
environmental quality that should not be related to road traffic on a priori
grounds. These regressions allow testing whether competitive procurement
was used more frequently in areas that are more environmentally friendly, a
procurement choice that would invalidate our IV results. Columns 1 and 2
contain results that use procurement status of each line as an instrument.
The placebo regression for SO2 shows no effect of railway transportation.
Also, in line with the complexities of the chemistry of ozone formation, there
is no significant effect for O3. These results reinforce the plausibility of the
main result that supporting railway services reduce road traffic externalities.
— Table 7 about here —
6.2.2 Robustness
Table 8 presents IV results that use procurement status and historical fre-
quency of service in 1939 and 1994 as instruments. The Kleibergen-Paap
(2006) weak identification statistic rejects the null of weak instruments at
the 10 % level but not at the 5 % level.32 Multiple IV results are estimated
using LIML. The overidentification test does not reject the null that the
instruments are valid in all cases except for accidents. In the cases where
the multiple IVs are valid, results are more precise than the baseline results
with just one instrument (Table 6). The additional precision is important for
the service elasticity of CO concentration which is negative and significantly
different from zero (at the 10 % level). In contrast, the service elasticity of
infant mortality turns insignificant. The null of the overidentification test
is rejected for accidents. This signals that the supplementary instruments
are not exactly orthogonal to the model errors. The service elasticity of acci-
dents is not quantitatively different with several instruments compared to the
single instrument case. This means that the resulting bias is quantitatively
on infant mortality turn insignificant with a point estimate slightly lower than the one we
report. We take this as evidence that expanding frequency of service is beneficial both
due to direct improvements in air quality and indirect improvements in health care due to
GDP growth. Results are available upon request from the authors.
32The statistic follows a χ2 distribution with three degrees of freedom.
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small. Overall, the multiple IV results suggest that our results are robust to
adding historical frequency of service to instrument for service growth.
— Table 8 about here —
6.2.3 Effects on modal choice
The analysis so far suggests that increasing the frequency of service on re-
gional passenger train lines is beneficial for the environment. We have inter-
preted this as evidence of substitution from cars to trains. In this section,
we provide direct evidence for this. Table 9 therefore presents IV estimates
of the effect of increasing frequency of regional passenger train service on the
change in the probability of using cars or motorcycles for commuting, leisure
activities, shopping, week-end trips or taking children to school. Results in-
dicate strong negative effects of service frequency on the probability of using
cars or motorcycles to commute to work or leisure activities (e.g., watch a
movie or soccer game). A 10 % increase in the frequency of service (an in-
crease by 0.1 log points) reduces car or motorcycle use by 2.7 percentage
points in commuting to work and by 2.8 percentage points in leisure activi-
ties. Point estimates are also negative but less strong for shopping, week-end
trips, or taking children to school. These activities are arguably also those
where trains are not a good substitute for cars or motorcycles.
— Table 9 about here —
Evidence in Table 9 strongly suggests that adding regional passenger
trains does induce substitution from cars and motorcycles to trains for two
key activities. Consistent with the analysis presented here, Bo¨ttger and
Po¨rner (2007) report an increase in the usage of local passenger railways
in Germany from 30.3 billion passenger kilometers to 40.2 billion passenger
kilometer. In a similar vein, LNVG (2010) reports growth rates of passenger
transportation that are often substantially above the growth rates of supply,
measured in train kilometers.33 Such strong demand effects are necessary
conditions for the substitution effects of supporting public transport.
33For instance, on the Weser-Ems Netz run by Nord-West-Bahn, the number of passen-
gers grew by 248 % between 1998 and 2006, with a concomitant growth in the number of
passengers per train by more than 50 %.
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Summing up, while the OLS regressions show no effect of railway services
on the outcome variables, in the IV regressions an increase in the frequency
of service tends to reduce those externalities to which trains contribute more
than cars. This observation suggests that those lines with strong growth
of the frequency of service have unobserved characteristics that would have
made relatively bad outcomes likely in the absence of improved railway ser-
vices. This seems to be consistent with the practice of the agencies to increase
supply on those lines where demand increases are expected. Such expected
demand increases will most likely go hand in hand with overall increases in
expected transportation which would lead to worse outcomes without im-
provements in public transport.
7 Valuation of Benefits from Public Trans-
portation
The empirical analysis shows that expanding the frequency of service on
regional passenger lines reduces the number of accidents, the concentration
of NO and NO2, and infant mortality. This section discusses a back-of-the-
envelope assessment of the economic benefits of supporting regional passenger
train lines in two steps. The first step calculates the reduction in road traffic
externalities due to increased frequency of regional train service. Results in
Table 6 provide estimates of the elasticity of each outcome with respect to
regional train service. We combine the elasticities and the observed increase
in the frequency of passenger rail service between 1994 and 2004 to estimate
the percentage reduction of each road traffic externality measure (Table 10
column 1). This percentage reduction due to regional passenger trains can
be combined with data on the observed level of each externality measure in
2004 to estimate the number of prevented accidents, reduced concentrations
of NO and NO2, and prevented infant deaths.
34 The second step assesses
34Specifically, let x be the percentage reduction in the outcome due to increased rail
service (in absolute value). For instance, for severe road accidents x = 14.2. Let z be the
counterfactual outcome in 2004 without increased rail service. The observed level of the
outcome in 2004, y, is related to the hypothetical outcome without expanded service, i.e.
y = (1 − x/100)z. This allows backing out the hypothetical situation without expanded
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the economic value of the prevented accidents, infant deaths and reductions
in concentration based on estimates published in the literature. We provide
minimal, maximal, and average valuations by considering the lowest, highest
and intermediate unit value of reducing externalities.
— Table 10 about here —
Table 10 presents our back-of-the-envelope estimates of the economic
value of reducing road traffic externalities. Consider first the economic value
of preventing severe road accidents. The 28.4 % expansion of regional passen-
ger train service between 1994 and 2004 reduced severe accidents by 13.2 %.
This amounts to preventing almost 70 thousand of the total of 454 thousand
accidents involving road traffic in Germany in 2004. The economic value of
preventing one accident is in the order of 16,000 EUR according to BASt
(2006). The overall value of the accidents prevented because of expanded
regional passenger rail line service is in the order of 1.11 billion EUR.35
Next, consider the economic value of reducing the concentration of NO
and NO2. Our results indicate that expanding regional passenger train ser-
vice by 28 % reduces NO concentration by 10.8 %, and NO2 concentration
by 4.7 %. These reductions translate into a reduction of 2.29 µg/m3 for NO,
and a reduction of 1.37 µg/m3 for NO2. Palmquist’s (1982, 1983) studies
of the role of NO2 concentration for house prices suggest that a household
would pay 10.35 EUR per year for a reduction of NO2 concentration by one
µg/m3. A reduction of one NO2 concentration by one µg/m
3 is therefore
worth 383 million EUR to the 37 million German households. We conclude
that the value of reducing pollution due to supporting regional passenger
railways is approximately 876 million EUR for NO and approximately 524
million EUR for NO2.
36 Nitrogen is primarily emitted as NO and then ox-
service z. Table 10 column 3 reports the reduction in the outcome due to passenger trains
contrasting the actual outcome y with the hypothetical outcome z, i.e. the reduction due
to trains is y − z.
35BASt (2006) report the economic value of the average accident. Our elasticity values
concern severe accidents. Our estimate is therefore a lower bound for the actual damage.
36The ranges for the willingness-to-pay in Palmquist’s study range from 0.62 EUR to
20.1 EUR per year, which translate into the ranges given in Table 10.
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idizes to NO2. Therefore, effects on NO and NO2 inherently related and
should not be double counted.
Finally, consider the economic value of reduced infant mortality. The
expansion of regional passenger rail service between 1994 and 2004 reduced
infant mortality by 13.1%, or 446 infant deaths were prevented in 2004 be-
cause regional passenger rail service was expanded. Blomquist et al. (1996)
estimate the value of a statistical life for children based on the use of safety
equipment by their parents. These estimates of the value of the statistical
life of a child range from 3.9 million EUR to 6.4 million EUR or an average
of 5.1 million EUR. The value of reduced infant deaths due to expanded
regional passenger railways is 2.29 billion EUR (range 1.72 billion to 2.87
billion EUR).
What is the total value of expanding regional passenger railway service as
captured by the above calculations? The value of reducing air pollution and
the value of preventing infant deaths cannot simply be added up since air
pollution directly contributes to infant mortality. This means that the value
of prevented infant deaths is already (partly) reflected in the benefit estimates
for reduced air pollution. Yet adding the value of prevented accidents to
the value of reduced air pollution or to the value of reduced infant deaths
provides lower bound estimates on the total value of expanding regional train
service. A lower bound on the total value of reduced externalities due to
expanded regional passenger train services is in the order of 1.98 billion EUR
using estimates for accidents and air pollution or of 3.39 billion EUR using
estimates for accidents and prevented infant deaths. All told, our analysis
suggests that the benefits from expanding railway transportation capacity
are substantial. Taking the subsidies of 6-7 billion EUR spent for the entire
provision of regional passenger services as a reference and assuming that the
28 % increase in railway services corresponds to a cost increase of similar size,
the costs for the additional services are likely to be in the order of magnitude
of 1.5 to 2 billion EUR. This compares favorably to the additional benefits.
Of course, these figures only refer to the types of externalities that we
consider in our analysis. The substitution from cars to railways most likely
has considerable effects on other externalities. For instance, the substitution
should lead to less emissions of carbon dioxide, less noise and lower congestion
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externalities. Increased emissions from electricity generation counterbalance
some of these effects. However, because of strict environmental regulations
for power plants and the predominance of diesel trains, this countervailing
effect is likely to be small.37
8 Concluding Remarks
This paper exploits regional variation in the supply of railway services to iden-
tify the effects of support for passenger railways on road traffic externalities.
Our results suggest that supporting passenger railways provides substantial
benefits in terms of reduced road traffic externalities. Results indicate that
the elasticities are substantial. Severe road accidents decrease by 4.7 %, ni-
tric oxide emissions decrease by 3.8 %, and infant mortality decreases by 4.6
% for every 10 % increase in regional passenger railway service.
Regional passenger railway service is heavily subsidized in Germany. Is
this a worthwhile cost to taxpayers? We provide estimates of the monetary
benefits of the 28 % expansion in the capacity of regional railway services
between 1994 and 2004. Our estimates indicate that these monetary benefits
are in the same order of magnitude as the costs. While we do not have any
precise figures on the additional subsidies required to finance this growth,
it appears unlikely that these additional funds are much higher than the
corresponding monetary benefits.
In principle, our empirical procedure is applicable to other countries with
local variation in the development of railway services. We addressed endo-
geneity concerns by using the mode of procurement as an instrument. In
some countries this approach cannot be applied, because procurement either
relies exclusively on competition (as in Great Britain) or not at all (as in
Switzerland). Yet Denmark and the Netherlands are gradually extending
competitive tendering off their core networks (Nash 2008). The empirical
approach may therefore become increasingly important.
37 Moreover, as argued for instance by Gibbons and Machin (2005) for the UK using
housing data, improved public transport also has private benefits. These benefits result
from travel time spendings and better access to jobs.
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A Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Map of regional railway lines
Notes: Thin lines denote non-competitively procured train lines, bold lines competitively
procured train lines, and point important cities: B: Berlin, D: Du¨sseldorf, DD: Dresden,
F: Frankfurt (Main), H: Hanover, HB: Bremen, HH: Hamburg, HRO: Rostock, K:
Cologne, L: Leipzig, M: Munich, N: Nuremberg, and S: and Stuttgart.
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Figure 2: Variation in Service Growth
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
N Mean Median Std. Dev.
A. Outcomes
Accidents 544 -0.1807 -0.1076 0.3073
CO 551 -0.4230 -0.4407 0.2320
NO 551 -0.0583 -0.1295 0.4246
NO2 551 -0.1077 -0.1095 0.1240
Infant mortality 551 -0.2963 -0.2855 0.3225
B. Placebo Outcomes
SO2 551 -1.2910 -1.0831 0.6081
O3 551 0.0861 0.0880 0.0729
C. Train Lines
Frequency of service 551 0.2838 0.2364 0.3683
Electrification 551 0.4537 0.0000 0.4983
Length (log km) 551 3.8071 3.8286 0.7975
Distance to city (/100 km) 551 0.1781 0.0000 0.2928
D. Instruments
Auction 551 0.2505 0.0000 0.4337
Long distance trains in 1939 551 0.2087 0.0000 0.4068
Long distance trains in 1994 551 0.0526 0.0000 0.2235
Notes: This table reports descriptive statistics. A and B and frequency of service in C
present differences in the log of the variables in 2004 and 1994. Electrification is 1 if the
line has electric traction, 0 if it has diesel traction. Length (log km) is the log of length of
the line in kilometers. Distance to city is 0 if the line runs through a city of at least 100,000
inhabitants in 1994. Train lines that do not run through a city have a positive distance to
city that is equal to the air distance to the nearest city with at least 100,000 inhabitants (”as
the crow flies”). Auction takes the value 1 if the line was procured using an auction rather
than in direct negotiations with the incumbent between 1994 and 2004. Long distance trains
in 1939 takes the value 1 if line shared track with long-distance lines served by more than 6
long-distance trains per day in 1939. Long distance trains in 1994 takes the value 1 if the
line shared track with long-distance lines served by more than 6 long distance trains (=ICE
trains) per day in 1994.
Sources: Own calculations based on data from published railway timetables, the federal
agency for road transportation, the federal environmental agency and state statistical agen-
cies.
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Table 2: Do Trains Matter for the Environment? OLS Results
Accidents CO NO NO2 InfMort
Frequency of service 0.011 -0.024 0.010 0.004 0.021
(0.030) (0.016) (0.024) (0.010) (0.047)
Electric traction 0.031* -0.004 0.037* 0.025*** -0.054**
(0.018) (0.014) (0.021) (0.008) (0.027)
Length (log km) 0.009 -0.004 -0.019 -0.009* -0.013
(0.013) (0.010) (0.013) (0.005) (0.017)
Distance to city (100 km) -0.088** 0.040 -0.095** -0.046** 0.017
(0.034) (0.026) (0.043) (0.019) (0.068)
Adj. R-squared 0.601 0.629 0.701 0.459 0.097
Train Lines 544 551 551 551 551
Notes: This table reports the results of OLS regressions of the change in the log of the
outcome variables in 2004 and 1994. All regressions control for fixed effects of federal
states. See notes to Table 1 for definition of control variables. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. The variables electric traction, track length, distance to city, and state effects
are time invariant and, thus, capture differential trends in the dependent variable across
these line characteristics and states or characteristic- and state-specific time effects.
Sources: Own calculations based on data from published railway timetables, the federal
agency for road transportation, the federal environmental agency and state statistical agen-
cies.
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Long distance trains in 1939 0.090**
(0.040)
Long distance trains in 1994 -0.116**
(0.046)
Electric traction -0.014 -0.034
(0.034) (0.039)
Length (log km) -0.070*** -0.075***
(0.023) (0.023)
Distance to city (100 km) -0.049 -0.045
(0.068) (0.067)
F-stat instruments 10.256 6.940
Adj. R-squared 0.060 0.066
Train Lines 551 551
Notes: This table reports the results of OLS regressions of the change in the log of frequency
of service of regional passenger trains between 2004 and 1994 on three instruments. Auction
takes the value 1 if the line was procured using an auction rather than in direct negotiations
with the incumbent between 1994 and 2004. Long distance trains in 1939 takes the value 1 if
line was served by more than 6 long distance trains per day in 1939. Long distance trains in
1994 takes the value 1 if the line was served by more than 6 long distance trains (=ICE trains)
in 1994. All regressions control for fixed effects of federal states. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. The variables electric traction, track length, distance to city, and state effects
are time invariant and, thus, capture differential trends in the dependent variable across
these line characteristics and states or characteristic- and state-specific time effects.
Sources: Own calculations based on data from published railway timetables.
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Table 4: Do Auctions Predict Future Changes in Environmental Quality?
Reduced Form Estimates
Accidents CO NO NO2 InfMort
Auction -0.063*** -0.023* -0.051** -0.022** -0.062*
(0.019) (0.013) (0.026) (0.010) (0.032)
Electric traction 0.018 -0.008 0.027 0.020** -0.067**
(0.018) (0.014) (0.021) (0.008) (0.028)
Length (log km) 0.009 -0.003 -0.019 -0.009* -0.014
(0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.005) (0.017)
Distance to city (100 km) -0.082** 0.043* -0.091** -0.044** 0.023
(0.035) (0.026) (0.043) (0.019) (0.068)
Adj. R-squared 0.608 0.630 0.703 0.465 0.102
Train Lines 544 551 551 551 551
Notes: This table reports the results of OLS regressions of the change in environmental
quality between 2004 and 1994 on whether the line was auctioned between 1994 and 2004
or not. Auction takes the value 1 if the line was procured using an auction rather than in
direct negotiations with the incumbent between 1994 and 2004. All regressions control for
fixed effects of federal states. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The variables electric
traction, track length, distance to city, and state effects are time invariant and, thus, capture
differential trends in the dependent variable across these line characteristics and states or
characteristic- and state-specific time effects.
Sources: Own calculations based on data from published railway timetables, the federal
agency for road transportation, the federal environmental agency and state statistical agen-
cies.
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Table 5: Do Auctions Predict Past Changes in Environmental Quality? An-
alyzing Pre-Trends
NO NO2 InfMort
Auction 0.012 0.009 0.034
(0.023) (0.010) (0.023)
Electric traction 0.006 -0.006 -0.012
(0.020) (0.009) (0.019)
Length (log km) -0.023* -0.009* 0.023*
(0.012) (0.006) (0.014)
Distance to city (100 km) -0.123*** -0.046** -0.007
(0.046) (0.023) (0.044)
Adj. R-squared 0.639 0.680 0.032
Train Lines 551 551 551
Notes: This table reports the results of OLS regressions of the change in the log of outcomes
between 1994 and 1990 on whether the line was auctioned between 1994 and 2004 or not,
and line characteristics. CO data is not available before 1997 and we have not been able to
locate data on road accidents going back to 1990. All regressions control for fixed effects of
federal states. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The variables electric traction, track
length, distance to city, and state effects are time invariant and, thus, capture differential
trends in the dependent variable across these line characteristics and states or characteristic-
and state-specific time effects.
Sources: Own calculations based on data from published railway timetables, the federal
environmental agency and state statistical agencies.
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Table 6: Do Trains Matter for the Environment? IV Estimates
Accidents CO NO NO2 InfMort
Frequency of service -0.464** -0.171 -0.382* -0.167* -0.462*
(0.197) (0.109) (0.222) (0.090) (0.273)
Electric traction 0.011 -0.010 0.021 0.018* -0.074**
(0.026) (0.015) (0.026) (0.010) (0.032)
Length (log km) -0.024 -0.014 -0.046** -0.021** -0.046*
(0.021) (0.013) (0.022) (0.008) (0.026)
Distance to city (100 km) -0.102** 0.035 -0.109** -0.053** 0.000
(0.047) (0.028) (0.052) (0.023) (0.073)
F-stat (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Train Lines 544 551 551 551 551
Notes: This table reports the results of IV regressions of the change in the log of outcomes
between 2004 and 1994 on the frequency of service, instrumented with the procurement
status of the line. All regressions control for fixed effects of federal states. The F-stat (p-
value) reports the p-value on the joint test of significance of the regressors. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. The variables electric traction, track length, distance to city, and state
effects are time invariant and, thus, capture differential trends in the dependent variable
across these line characteristics and states or characteristic- and state-specific time effects.
Sources: Own calculations based on data from published railway timetables, the federal
agency for road transportation, the federal environmental agency and state statistical agen-
cies.
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Table 7: Do Trains Matter for the Environment? Placebo Estimates
SO2 O3
Frequency of service 0.173 0.059
(0.159) (0.041)
Electric traction 0.005 0.001
(0.022) (0.005)
Length (log km) 0.046*** -0.000
(0.017) (0.004)
Distance to city (100 km) 0.071 -0.010
(0.046) (0.012)
F-stat (p-value) 0.000 0.000
Train Lines 551 551
Notes: This table reports the results of IV regressions of the change in the log of placebo
outcomes between 2004 and 1994 on the frequency of service. Frequency of train service
is instrumented with the procurement status of the line. F-stat is the p-value on the joint
test of significance of regressors in the 2nd stage regression. All regressions control for
fixed effects of federal states. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The variables electric
traction, track length, distance to city, and state effects are time invariant and, thus, capture
differential trends in the dependent variable across these line characteristics and states or
characteristic- and state-specific time effects.
Sources: Own calculations based on data from published railway timetables and the federal
environmental agency.
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Table 8: Do Trains Matter for the Environment? Using Multiple Instruments
Accidents CO NO NO2 InfMort
Frequency of service -0.528** -0.178* -0.425** -0.178** -0.340
(0.253) (0.092) (0.190) (0.077) (0.219)
Electric traction 0.008 -0.010 0.020 0.018* -0.069**
(0.028) (0.015) (0.026) (0.010) (0.029)
Length (log km) -0.028 -0.015 -0.049** -0.021*** -0.038*
(0.024) (0.012) (0.020) (0.008) (0.023)
Distance to city (100 km) -0.104** 0.035 -0.111** -0.053** 0.004
(0.050) (0.028) (0.054) (0.023) (0.070)
Overid. (p-value) 0.072 0.992 0.800 0.944 0.446
KP F-stat (1st stage) 7.029 6.940 6.940 6.940 6.940
F stat (p-value, 2nd stage) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Train Lines 544 551 551 551 551
Notes: This table reports limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) estimates of the effect of the
change in frequency of service on the change in the log of outcomes between 2004 and 1994. Frequency of
service is instrumented with the procurement status of the line and historical data on track sharing with
long-distance trains in 1939 and 1994. All regressions control for fixed effects of federal states. Overid.
(p-value) is the p-value on the overidentification test. KP F-stat (1st stage) is the first stage Kleibergen-
Paap statistic. F-stat (p-value, 2nd stage) is the p-value on the joint test of significance of regressors in
the 2nd stage regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The variables electric traction, track
length, distance to city, and state effects are time invariant and, thus, capture differential trends in the
dependent variable across these line characteristics and states or characteristic- and state-specific time
effects.
Sources: Own calculations based on data from published railway timetables, the federal agency for road
transportation, the federal environmental agency and state statistical agencies.
41
Table 9: Do Trains Reduce Car or Motorcycle Use?
Work Leisure Shop Weekend KidsSchool
Frequency of service -0.266** -0.275** -0.083 -0.039 -0.064
(0.130) (0.124) (0.081) (0.087) (0.111)
Electric traction 0.003 -0.011 0.023** 0.003 0.003
(0.015) (0.014) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014)
Length (log km) -0.021 -0.051*** -0.012 -0.019** -0.003
(0.013) (0.012) (0.008) (0.009) (0.012)
Distance to city (100 km) 0.100*** -0.088*** -0.031 -0.058** 0.013
(0.035) (0.027) (0.024) (0.026) (0.031)
F-stat (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Train Lines 547 548 548 548 546
Notes: This table reports the results of IV regressions of the effect of the frequency of service on regional
passenger trains on the change of the probability of car or motorcycle use for various purposes between
2003 and 1998. Trains are instrumented with the procurement status of the line. All regressions control
for fixed effects of federal states. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The variables electric traction,
track length, distance to city, and state effects are time invariant and, thus, capture differential trends
in the dependent variable across these line characteristics and states or characteristic- and state-specific
time effects.
Sources: Own calculations based on data from published railway timetables and the SOEP.
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Table 10: The Monetary Value of Supporting Regional Trains
Reduction Level in 2004 Reduction Unit value Total value
due to trains due to trains (mil. EUR) (mil. EUR)
(relative) (absolute) per
A. Valuing road accidents
Percent Accidents Accidents Accident a)
Average -13.2 454113 -69059 0.016 -1105
B. Valuing NO concentration
Percent Micrograms Micrograms Microgram b)
Average -10.8 18.91 -2.29 382.60 -876
Minimal -10.8 18.91 -2.29 22.84 -52
Maximal -10.8 18.91 -2.29 742.36 -1700
C. Valuing NO2 concentration
Units Percent Micrograms Micrograms Microgram b)
Average -4.7 27.79 -1.37 382.60 -524
Minimal -4.7 27.79 -1.37 22.84 -31
Maximal -4.7 27.79 -1.37 742.36 -1017
D. Valuing infant mortality
Percent Infant deaths Infant deaths Infant death c)
Average -13.1 2957 -446 5.14 -2293
Minimal -13.1 2957 -446 3.86 -1720
Maximal -13.1 2957 -446 6.43 -2866
Notes: Average refers to the average valuation, Minimal refers to minimal valuation, and maximal refers
to maximal valuation. a) Value of prevented accident from BASt (2006), b) value of nitrogen reduction
based on Palmquist (1982, 1983), annualized using 4 percent discount rate, aggregated for 37 million
households (Germany), c) value of a statistical life of a child from Blomquist (1996). All monetary values
in 2010 EUR.
Source: Own calculations, based on estimates in Table 6.
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Table A.1: Explaining Procurement Mode
base controls
Frequency of service in 1994 -0.056** 0.003
(0.028) (0.031)
Left vote share in 1994 -0.146 -0.470
(0.260) (0.466)
Accidents in 1994 -0.042* -0.042
(0.023) (0.034)
CO in 1994 0.209* 0.240
(0.122) (0.175)
NO in 1994 -0.126 -0.072
(0.099) (0.145)
NO2 in 1994 -0.416* -0.001
(0.246) (0.343)
Infant mortality in 1994 0.251*** 0.268***
(0.083) (0.083)
SO2 in 1994 -0.134*** -0.020
(0.050) (0.101)




Length (log km) 0.021
(0.032)
Distance to city (100 km) 0.056
(0.087)
State Effects No Yes
F-test for pollutants (p-value) 0.019 0.784
Adj. R-squared 0.049 0.118
Train Lines 547 547
Notes: This table reports linear probability models of procurement choice. Left vote share in 1994 is the
vote share (secondary vote) of social democrats (SPD), green party (Gruene), and the left party (Linke)
in the 1994 federal election. Pollutants, accidents, and infant mortality are measured in logs.
Sources: Own calculations based on data from published railway timetables, the federal agency for road
transportation, the federal environmental agency and state statistical agencies.
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